Ten years have passed since the financial crisis and many pundits are using this arbitrary anniversary to prognosticate the next great financial calamity. This week, CLOs take their turn in the spotlight.
Recent headlines paint a picture of subprime auto lending as the ticking time bomb for the next “great financial crisis.” But are investors really staring down the edge of a cliff? While a closer analysis reveals undeniable parallels to the mortgage crisis, we don’t believe securitized credit investors should hit the panic button just yet.
In April, we provided support for allocations to high yield by rebutting three common arguments against the asset class. “Retail is the new energy” was an argument against high yield in April and one that continues today. Given the headlines surrounding the “demise” of retail, we believe it is appropriate to offer investors a deeper analysis of the topic and provide a broader perspective across credit markets.
While no one measure is capable of capturing the full breadth of risk within a fixed income portfolio, VAR (Value at Risk) is an important measure within an investor’s tool kit. However, like any tool, VAR must be used with a full understanding of its benefits and drawbacks. With this in mind, we set out to answer: VAR, what is it good for?
How can insurers counter the margin compression resulting from new money rates lagging portfolio book yields? In a series of upcoming blog posts, we will highlight opportunities and risks across the six traditional levers that insurance companies can pull to offset this yield erosion.
Many “experts” have recently warned of impending doom in the high yield bond market. High yield returns have certainly been impressive since the energy- and commodity-led sell-off of late 2015/early 2016, but our view of today’s economic and market landscape doesn’t lead us to the conclusion that the end is near. Rather, we find reasonable value in the market and used the March sell-off to add high yield exposure.
Private credit is often viewed through the lens of mezzanine below-investment grade debt. But this is only a subset of the asset class. In fact, investment grade offerings account for a large part of the total market. So what do structure, pricing, and liquidity look like in the investment grade private credit market? How are deals sourced best in the investment grade market? The answer may come as surprise to some investors.